The global order is in flux. As multipolarity accelerates and Western-led institutions lose their grip, emerging blocs like BRICS+ are redrawing the map of global power. Yet one major collective remains underrepresented in this new architecture: the Islamic world.
With 57 member states and nearly two billion people, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is the second-largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations. But it lacks geopolitical cohesion and institutional leverage. What if that changed? What if the OIC entered BRICS+ not merely as scattered individual states, but as a unified bloc—mirroring the European Union’s coordinated presence in global forums like NATO or the UN?
This vision is not about symbolism. It is a pragmatic recalibration of how the Muslim world engages with the 21st century. The OIC’s entry as a collective actor in BRICS+ would create a new node of geo-economic agency. It could connect the financial muscle of the Gulf, the industrial depth of Turkey, the demographic heft of Indonesia, and the developmental needs of Africa—into a single strategic voice within the Global South.
But such a move must be more than political. It must be functional, structured, and credible. To avoid replicating the bureaucratic inertia that has plagued many multilateral bodies, the OIC’s engagement in BRICS+ must be accompanied by a dedicated technical platform: one that coordinates projects, aligns investments, and drives cross-sectoral collaboration.
This is where the idea of the Global Equitable South Cooperation Network (GESCON) comes into play—not as a standalone think tank, but as an internal engine for OIC’s strategic integration within BRICS+. Hosted initially in Jakarta, GESCON would serve as a neutral, non-state diplomatic platform—bridging Islamic economies with broader Global South initiatives.
GESCON’s primary mission would be fourfold.
First, it would act as a strategic integrator across sectors—mapping shared development priorities across Muslim-majority states, from halal food security and green hydrogen to fintech and cross-border logistics. These sectors are too important to be addressed through isolated bilateral deals. They need coordinated frameworks, especially within the scale and ambition of BRICS+.
Second, GESCON would serve as a matchmaker between projects and funding. Despite the trillions in sovereign wealth held by OIC members—such as the Saudi PIF, Qatar’s QIA, and the UAE’s ADIA—investments often lack alignment with broader South-South development goals. GESCON could help connect these funds with viable projects in undercapitalized regions, such as halal agriculture in West Africa or Islamic fintech platforms in South Asia.
Third, it would provide a space for quiet diplomacy (Track 1.5/2)—allowing technocrats, academics, and former officials to negotiate sensitive issues away from the limelight. This is especially crucial in the Islamic world, where intra-bloc tensions—Saudi-Iran, Turkey-Egypt, or Pakistan-Afghanistan—often paralyze cooperation. A neutral, technical space could offer a low-pressure environment for consensus-building.
Fourth, GESCON could function as a knowledge platform, building collaborative research, white papers, and data observatories through a network of think tanks in Indonesia, Morocco, Malaysia, Turkey, and Egypt. This would allow the Islamic world to not only consume development narratives but to produce and shape them.
Why Indonesia?
Because Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy, a founding voice in South-South solidarity since the 1955 Bandung Conference, and a recently admitted member of the BRICS-linked New Development Bank. It is geographically and diplomatically positioned as a neutral convener—unburdened by sectarian rivalries and seen as credible across the Global South.
Jakarta could serve as the base for GESCON, with satellite hubs in Istanbul, Lagos, and Dubai—forming a geographic triangle of Islamic economic connectivity. This approach would not only elevate Indonesia’s role but decentralize the platform away from any single power, preserving the balance and inclusiveness essential for legitimacy.
Of course, this vision faces challenges: political divergence among OIC states, suspicion toward new institutional actors, and the ever-present threat of great power interference. But therein lies the opportunity. A platform like GESCON—lean, neutral, and developmental—can avoid the geopolitical traps that have derailed many previous initiatives. It would not replace the OIC or BRICS+, but stitch together their common interests.
The idea is simple but urgent: let the Islamic world enter the 21st-century global order not as a fragmented observer, but as a coordinated actor. Let it contribute not only to global debates, but to global solutions—on climate, food, finance, and digital governance. The OIC, through a technical bridge like GESCON, can be more than a symbol. It can be a strategy.
In a time when the West turns inward and North-South asymmetries persist, the Global South must build its own mechanisms for convergence. Indonesia, if it dares to lead not by dominance but by design, can offer that convergence.
If the European Union has NATO, why shouldn’t the OIC have BRICS?